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STUDENT COMMENTS
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY: RECENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE
NOERR-PENNINGTON DEFENSE
In 1961, the Supreme Court, in Eastern Railroad Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,' held that concerted attempts to
influence legislative or executive governmental action are immune
from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws despite the fact that such
governmental action would result in a restraint of trade. 2 In 1965, in
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,' the Supreme Court
arguably broadened this judicially fashioned immunity to include ef-
forts aimed at persuading "public officials" to take action detrimental
to competition even though these efforts were inspired by anti-
competitive motives.' Two recent decisions in the Ninth and Fifth
Circuits, Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.' and
Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer-
ica,' have narrowed the applicability of this antitrust immunity enun-
ciated in Noerr and enlarged by Pennington. Trucking Unlimited held
that attempts to use administrative proceedings which are essentially
adjudicative in nature to further a group's anti-competitive purposes,
are not immune."' Woods held that submission of false gas production
forecasts to a regulatory agency is not immune when these forecasts
are used to determine production allowables for competitors because
this determination is an "apolitical" process.' These two cases° have
raised important questions regarding the manner and scope in which
business groups can concertedly seek to use the administrative func-
tions of government to further anti-competitive objectives.
I. THE RECENT DECISIONS
In Trucking Unlimited, the complainant, seeking treble damages
and injunctive relief for one group of truckers, alleged a conspiracy
among the defendants, another group of truckers, to restrain and mo-
nopolize the highway common carrier business in California? The
1 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
2 Id. at 136.
8 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
4 Id, at 670.
5 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970).
a 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.) 11 73,422 (5th Cir. 1971).
7 432 F.2d at 759.
8 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.) 11 73,442 at 89,725 (5th Cir. 1971).
9 In both Trucking Unlimited and Woods, the courts of appeals reversed the district
courts' decisions which had held the Noerr-Pennington immunity applicable. Trucking Un-
limited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 11 72,298 (N.D. Cal. 1967) and
Woods Exploration & Producing Co., Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 304 F. Supp.
845 (S.D. Tex. 1969). These reversals indicate that the scope of this antitrust immunity
Is not well defined.
10 432 F.2d at 757.
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defendants conducted a jointly financed, well publicized program of
opposing, before the California Public Utilities Commission (PUC),
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), and the courts, all ap-
plications by actual or potential competitors for the granting of li-
censes for operating rights." As a result of the defendants' activities,
the financial resources of the plaintiffs and other competitors were de-
pleted," applications for operating rights were defeated, and, conse-
quently, the plaintiffs were discouraged from instituting and pursuing
license applications."
The court of appeals held that attempts to influence judicial pro-
ceedings or administrative proceedings which are essentially adjudica-
tory in nature are not immune under the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trines." The court found that the administrative licensing procedure
in Trucking Unlimited was adjudicative, rather than legislative, in na-
ture, primarily because the PUC applied a standard of "public con-
venience and necessity" to various fact situations when it reviewed li-
cense applications." The court reasoned that it was not necessary to
protect access to judicial and administrative-adjudicatory proceedings
because the public interest in maintaining open access to legislators
and law enforcement officials, which justifies the antitrust immunity
granted to efforts aimed at influencing those officials, is not present in
adjudicatory determinations." This public interest is not present be-
cause judicial and administrative adjudicators do not act in a represen-
tative capacity and hence, information and opinions provided by pro-
tecting access to them would not be relevant to the determinations
they make."
The court held that the defendants' activities were not immune
for an additional reason, one independent from its finding that joint
approaches to adjudicatory bodies were not immune. The court found
that the primary purpose of the defendants' activities was to interfere
11 Id. The defendants agreed to and did establish a joint trust fund with monthly
contributions made to the fund on the basis of each defendant's gross income. This fund
was used to finance their opposition to all applications filed by their competitors before
the PUC and the ICC. In addition, it was used to pursue applications through the vari-
ous stages of administrative and judicial review. Id. at 762.
12 Id. at 762. Evidently, to pursue even an initially successful determination through
the review process was quite costly.
12 Id. The district noted in its opinion that an exhibit of the plaintiffs' showed that
21 out of 40 matters which had reached the decision stage "resulted in action favorable
to defendants either because the opposed application was denied by the agency in whole
or in part or substantially reduced in scope or because the application was dismissed by
the applicant after defendants appeared in opposition." Trucking Unlimited v. California
Motor Transp. Co., 1967 Trade Cas. 72,298 at 84,744 (ND. Cal. 1967).
14 432 F.2d at 758.
15
 Id. at 758 n.4. The court further stated that even if the agency determinations
were "quasi-legislative" in nature, and thus within the Noerr-Pennington immunity, the
defendants' appeal of adverse determinations to the courts would be subject to the anti-
trust laws. Id.
10 Id. at 759 n.6.
12
 Id.
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directly with the plaintiffs' business operations by discouraging the
filing of license applications." The court determined that any injury
incurred by adverse determinations of the PUC was an "incidental"
result of the method employed by the defendants to procure the pri-
mary result, the discouragement and subsequent failure to file license
applications." The finding that the defendants' primary purpose was
to injure competitors directly allowed the court to apply the "sham"
exception, articulated but not employed by the Supreme Court in
Noerr, to the antitrust immunity granted to activity designed to influ-
ence governmental action 20
The Fifth Circuit, in Woods, cited Trucking Unlimited to estab-
lish that activities not directed at policy-making functions of govern-
ment are not immune from the antitrust laws.21 The defendants in
Woods were two large-tract gas producers who had allegedly filed false
production forecasts with the Texas Railroad Commission. 22 The Com-
mission used those production forecasts in a formula to set the produc-
tion allowables for the plaintiffs' wells." The defendants were required
to submit their production forecasts and the Commission had no means
of verifying these submissions.24
The court of appeals did not attempt to classify the rate-setting
process of the Commission as either administrative-legislative or
administrative-adjudicative, but rather, chose to separate the Com-
mission's actions into "political" and "apolitical" categories. 25 The
court stated that the establishment of the formula by which the pro-
duction allowables would be determined was basically a political act
in the Noerr sense since proceedings to decide the composition of the
formula would be "rule-making" proceedings. 2° However, the imple-
mentation of the formula, the court felt, was an "apolitical" act be-
cause once the makeup of the formula had been decided upon, the rate
determination process did not involve any policy decisions. 27 Conse-
quently, the filing of false forecasts by the defendants for anti-
competitive purposes could not be protected by the Noerr-Pennington
12 Id. at 763.
19 Id.
20 In Noerr, the Supreme Court stated:
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed
toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.
365 U.S. at 144.
21 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.) If 73,442 at 89,724 (5th Cir. 1971).
22 Id. at 89,718.
22 Id. at 89,720.
24 Id. at 89,722.
25 Id. at 89,724.
22 Id. The court apparently felt that the establishment of the formula involved policy
decisions and was, therefore, a political governmental act, access to which Noerr sought
to protect.
27 Id.
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immunity." In reaching this decision, the court deemphasized the
broad language in Pennington granting immunity to all attempts at in-
fluencing "public officials!" 20
 The court observed that the Supreme
Court, in using such broad language, was not attempting to define the
scope of governmental action that might give rise to the antitrust im-
munity, but rather, was articulating the principle that anti-competitive
motive is irrelevant to the granting of immunity to efforts aimed at in-
fluencing certain "public officials."" The Woods' court felt the Su-
preme Court was concerned with the intent issue when it referred to
"public officials" in Pennington.
The effect of these recent decisions on the Noerr-Pennington im-
munity has been to limit its application to concerted attempts to influ-
ence those acts of governmental agencies involving policy considera-
tions of a quasi-political nature." Under these decisions, antitrust
immunity does not extend to (1) administrative proceedings essentially
adjudicative in nature, and (2) administrative determinations imple-
mentive of, but not involving, policy decisions. In addition, these de-
cisions demonstrate a lack of tolerance on the part of the courts for the
use of governmental regulatory bodies to further anti-competitive ob-
jectives. These effects may have important ramifications for regulated
industries and businesses which are in continued contact with, and of-
ten seek action from, regulatory agencies. This interaction between ad-
ministrative bodies and their regulated businesses is often character-
ized by governmental reliance upon the businesses being regulated for
knowledge and information necessary for effective regulation." Truck-
ing Unlimited and Woods point out this interdependency and also
demonstrate the vulnerability of regulatory action to parties seeking to
carry out an anti-competitive scheme. These two decisions narrow the
broad sweep of the Noerr-Pennington immunity in an attempt to in-
sure the integrity of the regulatory process. Whether this narrowing is
warranted will be determined by examining the Noerr and Pennington
decisions to determine what the primary concerns of the Supreme
Court were when it developed this immunity from the antitrust laws.
28 Id. at 89,725.
20 Id. In Pennington, the Supreme Court stated: "Joint efforts to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition."
381 U.S. at 670.
so Id.
81 Cf. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 (1st
Ch.. 1970). In that case, used by the court in Woods to show that all attempts to influ-
ence governmental action are not immune, the court stated:
By "enforcement of laws" we understand some significant policy determination
in the application of a statute, not a technical decision. . . . We doubt whether
the [Pennington] Court, without expressing additional rationale, would have ex-
tended the Noe.. umbrella to public officials engaged in purely commercial deal-
ings when the case turned on other issues.
Id. at 32-33.
82 See Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66
Mich. L. Rev. 333, 356 (1967).
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After examining the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Noerr and
Pennington, this comment will analyze the specific limitations placed
upon antitrust immunity in Trucking Unlimited and Woods to deter-
mine if these are consistent with Noerr and Pennington. Finally, the
courts' concern, in both cases, for protecting the integrity of the regu-
latory process will be discussed.
IL THE RATIONALE OF THE NOERR-PENNINGTON IMMUNITY
In Noerr, the Supreme Court set out an immunity from the anti-
trust laws for activity primarily directed at influencing legislative or
executive decisions. That case involved an alleged conspiracy by a
group of railroads in hiring a public relations firm to conduct a pub-
licity campaign aimed at the enactment of laws that would restrict the
trucking business.88 It was alleged that the purpose of this publicity
campaign was to impair the public image of the truckers and to facili-
tate the passage and enforcement of laws designed to regulate the
trucking industry." Despite the fact that the defendants' motive in
seeking governmental action was to reduce competition from the
trucking industry, the Supreme Court held' that "at least insofar as the
railroads' campaign was directed toward obtaining governmental ac-
tion,"" the defendants did not violate the Sherman Act." The Court
based its decision upon two lines of reasoning. First, the Court had
held previously" that when a restraint of trade results from valid gov-
ernmental action, there is no violation of the Sherman Act." The
Court observed that it follows from those decisions that attempts "to
persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with
respect to a law" that would result in a restraint of trade, should also
be free from antitrust sanction because a prohibition of these activities
33 365 U.S. at 129.
84 Id. In their answer to the complaint, the railroads admitted that the publicity
campaign was designed to influence the passage and enforcement of laws, but denied that
it was motivated by a desire to interfere with the truckers' business. The Court found
that the primary purpose of the publicity campaign was to influence the passage and en-
forcement of laws. Id. at 131, 142-43.
83 Id. at 139-40.
80 In Noerr, the complaint alleged violations of ft 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. {I§ 1, 2 (1964).
87 United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939) ; Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
88 In Parker, the Supreme Court held that a state-adopted marketing program in
California under the California Agricultural Prorate Act for the 1940 raisin crop was
not invalidated by the Sherman Act even though the program would have violated "the
Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a contract, com-
bination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate." 317 U.S. at 350-52.
In Rock Royal, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Agricultural Mar-
keting Agreement Act of 1937 under which the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized
to issue an order fixing and equalizing minimum prices to be paid producers selling milk
to dealers. The Court also stated that "Ulf the Act and Order are otherwise valid, the
fact that their effect would be to give cooperatives a monopoly of the market would not
violate the Sherman Act...." 307 U.S. at 560.
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would seriously impair the power of government to regulate trade."
As a corollary to this proposition, the Court noted that the right of the
people to inform their representatives in government about any matter
cannot depend either upon their intent in doing so, or upon their finan-
cial interest in the matter." Secondly, the Court stated that the appli-
cation of the Sherman Act to the activities of the defendants would
violate their First Amendment right to petition the government.'". The
Court held that it could not impute a congressional intent into the
Sherman Act to infringe upon the right to petition because there was
no indication in the Act's legislative history that it was intended to reg-
ulate "political activity."42 Noerr, then, can be said to stand for the
proposition that restraints of trade which result from valid governmen-
tal action cannot be the basis of an antitrust suit against parties who
have influenced the government to take that action. This is so, even
though these parties have anti-competitive motives and act in an un-
ethical manner" to bring about the governmental action.
While Noerr held that activities aimed at influencing governmen-
tal action are immune from the antitrust laws, Pennington held that
not only are these activities alone immune, but also that such acts are
immune even if they are part of a broader scheme, itself violative of
the Sherman Act." Pennington involved joint action by coal producers
and a union which sought to reduce competition by procuring (1) the
establishment by the Secretary of Labor under the Walsh-Healey Act"
of a minimum wage for the employees of contractors selling coal to the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and (2) a change in the TVA's
coal-purchasing program so that more of its purchases would be made
from producers covered by the Walsh-Healey Act."
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals which had in-
85 365 U.S. at 136-37. In addition, the Court observed that an association organized
to induce governmental action that would produce a monopoly or a restraint on trade is
essentially dissimilar from those combinations that through the use of price-fixing agree-
ments, boycotts, market-division agreements, etc., take away the trade freedom of
others in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 136.
The Court also expressed concern about preserving the concept of representation upon
which our government operates. Freedom of access to the government, the Court felt, was
essential to effective representation because otherwise, the government would not be in-
formed of the people's views. Id, at 137.
45 Id. at 139.
41 Id. at 138. To avoid the First Amendment question, the Court construed the
Sherman Act as not contemplating the prohibition of the type of activity engaged in by
the defendant railroads. In effect, then, the Court was protecting the right to petition
without specifically defining or delimiting the scope of that right.
42 Id. at 137.
43 In Noerr, the defendants employed a third party public relations firm to conduct
the publicity campaign. The Court stated that this technique was "one which falls far
short of the ethical standards generally approved in this country." Id. at 140.
44 381 U.S. at 670.
45 41 U.S.C. §f 35-45 (1964).
46
 381 U.S. at 660-61. A substantial portion of the "spot market purchases" made
by the TVA were from producers which were exempt from the Walsh-Healey Act.
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terpreted Noerr as granting antitrust immunity only to conduct "un-
accompanied by a purpose or intent to further a conspiracy to violate
a statute. . . "47
 The Court reaffirmed the proposition that intent is ir-
relevant in determining whether the Noerr immunity applies, and also
made clear that joint efforts to influence "public officials," as part of a
scheme violative of the Sherman Act, are not proscribed."
Pennington is consistent with the rationale in Noerr. The joint
conduct of the defendants was an attempt to procure valid governmen-
tal action that would restrain trade, and not an attempt to restrain
trade directly. Urging the Secretary of Labor to exercise his discretion
under the Walsh-Healey Act was activity aimed at the "enforcement
of laws,"" and was similar to some of the activities of the defendants
in Noerr." The attempt to persuade the TVA to change its coal-
purchasing program, so that more producers selling coal to the TVA
would be encompassed by the Walsh-Healey Act, and, consequently,
would be required to pay the minimum wage, was conduct aimed at
changing a policy of an administrative agency. The Court had several
rationales available to it in holding this latter activity immune. The
Court might have classified it as "political activity" since it was aimed
at changing a policy of a governmental agency. Or, the Court might
have considered the agency action sought as essentially "rule making"
since it would have prescribed a policy of general or particular appli-
cability and future effect." On either of these grounds the Court could
have granted immunity under the Noerr doctrine. Instead, the Court .
interpreted Noerr as applying to conduct aimed at influencing all
"public officials,' and thereby included within the Noerr immunity
47 Pennington v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 F.2d 804, 817 (6th Cir.
1963).
45 381 U.S. at 670. The Court held that it was error to instruct the jury "that the
approach to the Secretary of Labor was legal unless part of a conspiracy to drive small
operators out of business. ." It held that the jury was not free to attribute illegality
to this act as part of a general plan to eliminate competition. In a footnote, the Court
did say that it would be within the province of the trial judge to admit evidence of ac-
tivities aimed at influencing a governmental official and agency "to show the purpose and'
character of the particular transactions under scrutiny." Id. at 670-71 n.3.
40 The court in Trucking Unlimited, found that if the approaches to the Secretary of
Labor were attempts to induce him to initiate proceedings under the Walsh-Healey Act in
order to set a minimum wage for a given industry, then these approaches would be at-
tempts to influence a policy decision and would thereby be protected by Noerr. The
court also observed that if the wage determination itself was sought to be influenced by
the defendants in Pennington, then, since that proceeding was quasi-legislative in nature,
the defendants' activities would also be protected by Noerr. 432 F.2d at 759 n.5.
Go In Noerr, the defendant railroads admitted that one purpose of their publicity
campaign was to encourage a more rigid enforcement of state laws penalizing truckers
for overweight loads and traffic violations. 365 U.S. at 131.
51 Section 2(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act defines a rule as "the whole or
any part of any agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect
designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe Iaw or policy...." 5 U.S.C. 1001 (1964):
52 381 U.S. at 669-71. The Court• continually refers to the Noerr immunity in refer-
ence to conduct aimed at influencing "public officials." Pennington has been criticized for
its use of broad language in defining the Noerr immunity. Sec Note,•The Brakes Fail on
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defendants' attempts to influence the TVA officials. Pennington, then,
seems to indicate that the Supreme Court wanted to extend Noerr to
action taken by administrative officials.
The Noerr and Pennington decisions indicate that the Supreme
Court was primarily concerned with two factors when it formulated
the antitrust immunity. First, the Court sought to insure the viability
of governmental regulation of business which might involve restraints
on trade." To do this, private activity to procure such governmental
action, regardless of the purposes of the private parties, must be pro-
tected because this activity insures government access to information
and opinion essential for informed and responsive regulation. Sec-
ondly, the Court wanted to safeguard the First Amendment right of
petition, a right essential to our form of representative government.
Because of these considerations, the Court in Noerr held that
Congress only sought to regulate business activities under the Sherman
Act. The Court relied upon Parker v. Brown" to demonstrate that po-
litical action, including state regulatory action, had been held exempt
from the Sherman Act." After Noerr, all aspects of a state regulatory
scheme are immune from antitrust proscriptions. Governmental action
is immune under Parker, and private attempts to procure and influence
this action are immune under Noerr. It is in light of the foregoing fac-
tors that an examination of the limitations placed upon the Noerr-
Pennington immunity by Trucking Unlimited and Woods can best be
made.
M. TRUCKING UNLIMITED V. CALIFORNIA MOTOR TRANSPORT Co.
A. Administrative-Adjudicative Action
In holding that agreements to utilize judicial and administrative-
adjudicative proceedings in an anti-competitive scheme are not im-
mune under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the court in Trucking
Unlimited reasoned that the fundamental rationale for the Noerr-
the Noerr Doctrine, 57 Calif. L. Rev. 518 (1969). The author, in criticizing the district
court decision in Trucking Unlimited, contends that since Noerr and Pennington were con-
cerned only with joint efforts to influence the legislative and executive functions of gov-
ernment, the use of the term "public officials" in Pennington does not extend the Noerr
doctrine to officials performing adjudicative functions. Id. at 520 n.19. Cf. Note, Applica-
tion of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Government Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev.
847 (1968), where the author thinks that Pennington extended Noerr's protection to ef-
forts aimed at influencing "government decisions," and criticizes this extension as being
too complete an immunity, not required by the facts of the case. He also contends that
extension of the immunity should depend upon whether the governmental decision is to
be made in a political or economic framework and not upon the daksification of a deci-
sion as legislative, executive or adjudicative. Id. at 852-53.
53 The Noerr Court stated that "such a holding [that the Sherman Act forbids
associations for the purpose of influencing the passage or enforcement of jaws] would
substantially impair the power of government to take actions through its legislature and
executive that operate to restrain trade." 365 US. at 137.
54 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
55 365 U.S. at 137.
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Pennington immunity did not apply because it is not the function of
courts or administrative agencies engaged in adjudication to determine
whether laws restraining trade will be enacted or enforced 6° In so
reasoning, the court assumed that the controlling rationale of Noerr
was to insure that governmental regulation of trade was not impaired
by preventing access to those branches of government that enact and
enforce laws restraining trade. The court largely ignored the right to
petition which also was an important factor in the Court's decision in
Noerr. The court did cite, however, several patent cases" to show that
the use of litigation to restrain trade can be prohibited by the Sherman
Act. By doing so, the court in effect was implying that prior case law
indicates that free and unrestricted access to the courts, which might
involve an exercise of the right to petition,'" an important concern of
the Noerr Court, may be constitutionally curtailed when this access is
used to further anti-competitive objectives.
Noerr examined the right to petition in the context of activities
comprising the solicitation of governmental action with respect to the
passage and enforcement of laws. The publicity campaign conducted
by the defendant railroads was admittedly designed to influence the
passage and enforcement of state laws restraining the trucking busi-
ness." In Noerr, the Court did not state that the right to petition could
not be limited, but rather, that in light of the possible impairment of
effective government regulation of trade that might result, and in light
of its finding that the Sherman Act was not intended to regulate "po-
litical activity," it could not allow the Sherman Act to limit the defen-
dants' activity in petitioning the government for laws restraining the
trucking business.°° The implication of this holding is that when these
two factors are not present, it may be constitutionally permissible to
limit a concerted effort to influence governmental action.
The court in Trucking Unlimited found that there was no possi-
bility of an impairment of governmental action restraining trade." It
stated that it would be fruitless to protect access to courts and agencies
engaged in adjudicatory determinations, because the information and
opinions so provided would not be relevant to these determinations.°
Consequently, limiting such access could not possibly impair govern-
39 432 F.2d at 758.
57 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965);
United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.,
198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1952); Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938).
38 In a footnote the court stated:
They (the patent cases] also support the proposition that, on balance, the
public interest in free competition served by the condemnation of agreements to
use judicial and administrative adjudicative processes for the purpose of restrain-
ing trade outweighs the resulting restraint upon First Amendment rights.
432 F.2d at 759 n.6.
59 365 U.S. at 131.
00 Id. at 138.
el 432 F.2d at 758-59.
€11 Id.
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mental action. In addition, the court did not consider the activity of
the defendants in opposing all applications before the agencies and the
courts as "political activity" in the Noerr sense. The court stated that
the political. activity referred to by the Supreme Court in Noerr .was
activity engaged in by people desiring to make known their wishes to
their representatives in government, either legislative or executive.° 3
Considering the possibility of impairment of governmental action as
the controlling rationale in Noerr, the court in Trucking Unlimited
placed little emphasis upon the political activity issue."
The court's theory that information provided by protecting access
to adjudicatory proceedings would be irrelevant to adjudicatory deter-
minations is belied by the success of the defendants in their opposition
to all license applications." Apparently, the information the defendant
truckers provided was, to some extent, employed by the agencies in
making their determinations." In addition, the defendants had a statu-
tory right to appear in opposition." This statutory right does not com-
pel the PUC to, use any information the defendants provide, but it does
indicate that the PUC had an interest in having opposition presented
and that procedures were established for the presentation of opposing
arguments. These factors indicate that limiting access to regulatory
agencies might impair effective governmental action in regulating trade
despite the fact that the agency is making an adjudicatory determina-
tion. Given the possibility of an impairment in effective governmental
action, limiting access to regulatory agencies by Sherman Act sanction
runs counter to Noerr. In Noerr, the Court was especially concerned
with not limiting the First Amendment right of access to government
when such limitation would impair the government's ability to regulate
trade. However, in prohibiting access by the defendants to the adjudi-
catory processes, the court in Trucking Unlimited actually was, in ef-
fect, opening up access to those processes for their competitors, and in
that respect the decision was consistent with Noerr. In other words,
the impairment in government regulation of trade resulting from •the
defendant's concerted opposition was more severe than any Impair-
ment that would result by limiting the defendants' access to adjudica-
tory proceedings.
While there is arguably a basis in Noerr for limiting access which
results in the impairment of effective government regulation 'of trade,
the distinction made by the court in Trucking Unlimited for activities
63 Id. at 758 n.3.
04 Id. at 758.
65 See note 13 supra with respect to the degree of the defendants' success.
66 In discussing the foreclosure of the plaintiffs from access to the PUC, the ICC
and the courts, the court stated that one of the effects of this foreclosure was that "it
denied those agencies and the courts the benefit of facts and information,required for the
making of competent decisions... ." 432 F.2d at 762. If this was one effect of the plain-
tiffs foreclosure, it appears that denying defendants access would have the same result.
67 Cal. Admin. Code tit, 20 (1967), Rules 53, 54; Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. II 305(e) (1964).
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aimed at influencing adjudicatory proceedings does not seem war-
ranted in light of Noerr and Pennington. Although Noerr clearly con-
templated the legislative and executive branches of government when
it granted immunity to •attempts to influence governmental action,
Pennington can be interpreted to include activities designed to influ-
ence administrative action." The court in Trucking Unlimited, how-
ever, distinguished Pennington by pointing out that the administrative
action sought to be influenced in that case did not appear to be adjudi-
catory in nature.°9 But by singling out the adjudicatory processes of
government, Trucking Unlimited prohibits access to agencies making
adjudicatory determinations when the party seeking access has anti-
competitive motives despite the fact that the party has a statutory
right, and possibly a constitutional right," to participate in the pro-
ceedings. This is not consistent with Noerr's holding that anti-
competitive motives are irrelevant when one is seeking governmental
action. Further, the decision sweeps too broadly in holding that anti-
trust immunity does not extend to adjudicatory proceedings. The suc-
cess of the defendants in Trucking Unlimited itself indicates that, at
least in some adjudicatory proceedings, the information made avail-
able through access to the governmental body is appropriate to the de-
terminations of that body.
Maintaining free access to all regulatory agency functions is im-
portant for another reason. Government regulatory schemes are be-
coming increasingly dependent upon the business they are regulating
for the information and knowledge essential for proper and effective
regulation. While it is important to prohibit activity that undermines
the regulatory process, such prohibition should be accomplished in a
manner that does not limit the agencies' access to information neces-
sary for effective regulation. Only when the access of groups to a reg-
ulatory agency's processes becomes counter-productive, in that it ei-
ther limits another group's access, as it did in Trucking Unlimited, or
undermines the agency function in some other manner, should it be
limited. Such limitations would.' be consistent with both the , constitu-
tional safeguards and the desire to prevent impairment in governmen-
tal regulation of trade expressed in Noerr.
B. The Sham Exception
In Noerr, the Supreme Court explicitly made reference to an ex-
ception to the grant of immunity for activity directed toward influ-
encing governmental action." The Court observed that there might be
68 See note 52 supra with respect to the effect of the Pennington decision on anti-
trust immunity.
00 See note 49 supra.
70 Pennington's interpretation of the Noerr immunity as extending to all "public offi-
dals" could possibly be an indication that the right to petition includes a right to petition
the whole government:Tf: Brown; The Right to Petition: Political or Legal Freedom?, 8
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 729 (1961).
Ti 30 U.S. at 144.
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situations when a publicity campaign is "ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action," yet, in reality, is an attempt to in-
jure competitors directly and that, therefore, such conduct would not
be immune." The court in Trucking Unlimited applied this exception
to the defendants' activities. The court found both direct injury result-
ing from the defendants' opposition, and a primary purpose on the de-
fendants' part to injure their competitors directly." Both findings were
necessary since in Noerr there was apparently direct injury yet no pri-
mary purpose to injure the truckers directly, and the Court conse-
quently termed the injury "incidental."'"
In Trucking Unlimited, the court determined that the primary
purpose of the defendants' activity was to deter the filing of applica-
tions for licenses and thereby preclude governmental action." The
court stated that the vigorous campaign to oppose all applications for
licenses had "effectively foreclosed" plaintiffs and other competitors
from access to the PUC, the ICC and the courts in review proceed-
ings." Since small trucking companies, prior to the defendants' joint
enterprise, had relatively free access to the PUC and the ICC, the
court found that the concerted opposition of the defendants, the largest
truckers in California and the western states, limited the small truck-
ers' access to these bodies, thereby directly injuring them."
This direct injury is somewhat different from that envisioned by the
Court in Noerr. In that case, the Court contemplated a publicity cam-
paign primarily designed to damage the good will and the business of
competitors while ostensibly directed toward the enactment or enforce-
ment of laws. The resulting injury would be a business injury not re-
lated to governmental action. In Trucking Unlimited, the injury is not
a business injury in that there is no interference with the relationship
between the truckers and their customers. The injury is also less direct
in that it results from the successful attempts by the defendants to pro-
cure governmental action, and from the defendants' financial ability to
undertake such opposition. Without governmental action adverse to
the plaintiff's interests there would have been less injury, that is, less
discouragement in the filing of applications. However, for a small
trucker to pursue, because of the defendants' opposition, even an ini-
tially favorable determination of his application through all the stages
of administrative and judicial review proved expensive. The expense
involved in pursuing an application combined with the probability of
72 Id.
" 432 F.2d at 762-63.
74 365 U.S. at 142-43.
76 432 F.2d at 762.
76 The court indicated that the plaintiffs were effectively foreclosed because the de-
fendants' opposition had depleted their financial resources, and defeated, delayed and re-
stricted their applications for operating rights, and deterred plaintiffs from instituting and
pursuing other applications. Id.
77 Id.
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being defeated evidently had a considerable deterrent effect upon the
plaintiffs."
Despite these differences in the nature of this injury from that
contemplated in Noerr, it is submitted that the denial of access to the
regulatory agency effected in Trucking Unlimited conflicts even more
fundamentally with the rationale of Noerr. Deterring competitors from
seeking governmental action runs counter to the concern of the Noerr
court that all groups have access to the government in order to pro-
mote the most effective regulation of trade. The use of the "sham" ex-
ception by the court in Trucking Unlimited is a means of making ac-
cess to the PUC and the ICC available to both the large and small
truckers, thereby restoring balance to the regulatory scheme—an ob-
jective the Court in Noerr hoped to accomplish by immunity.
The application of the sham exception to the grant of antitrust
immunity was an independent ground upon which the court in Truck-
ing Unlimited found that the Sherman Act applied to the defendants'
activities. However, the use of the sham exception in this case, because
of the type of direct injury involved, makes immunity depend, to a de-
' gree, upon the success or failure of a group's efforts at obtaining favor-
able regulatory action. The fact that the defendants in opposing all ap-
plications were extremely successful—in that a large number of final
determinations were made in their favor—caused some of the direct
injury that resulted, that is, some of the discouragement in filing other
applications. Combined with a primary purpose to injure competitors
directly, this direct injury might result in the removal of immunity. If
the defendants had been less successful in procuring favorable govern-
mental action, less discouragement would have resulted. If there re-
mained sufficient discouragement, resulting from the financial hard-
ships involved in pursuing an application, to produce injury, then
immunity would not be removed. However, in those instances where
discouragement can be attributed to the possibility of being defeated,
the sham exception to immunity depends upon success because with-
out success in obtaining favorable governmental action, there would
be no injury. In light of the reasons provided by the Court in Noerr
for the antitrust immunity, success or failure should play no part in
its application. Indeed, success in an attempt to influence governmen-
tal action may bring into operation the Parker immunity because
such success is dependent upon valid state action." The Noerr-
Pennington immunity is grounded in the right to petition and the
right of access to government and should not be dependent upon either
the degree of success or the result of an attempt to procure govern-
mental action. If the direct injury is due to successful attempts at
influencing governmental action, and the sham exception is used to
remove immunity, in effect, the primary purpose to injure competitors
7 8 See note 76 supra.
78 Cf. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 29
n.4 (1st Cir. 1970).
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directly would be controlling in the determination of immunity. This
would be inconsistent with the Noerr and Pennington reasoning that
anti-competitive motive is irrelevant. It appears, then, that the use of
the sham exception by the court in Trucking Unlimited, as an inde-
pendent ground for holding that the Sherman 'Act applied, would not
have been warranted if the direct injury to the plaintiffs appeared to
have resulted primarily from an otherwise lawful attempt to influence
governmental action. As a means of restoring balance to the regulatory
scheme, however, the use of the sham exception'when there is discour-
agement in access resulting from both successful attempts to procure
governmental action, and the financial hardships imposed in pursuing
opposed applications, appears to be consistent with the rationale of
Noerr because in this situation, there is some direct injury other than
that inflicted by valid governmental action."
IV. WOODS EXPLORATION & PRODUCING CO.,
INC. V. ALUMINUM CO. OF AMERICA
In Woods, the court limited the Noerr-Pennington immunity to
activity aimed at influencing policy-making decisions." In doing so,
the court interpreted Noerr's grant of immunity to conduct seeking the
"enforcement of laws" as constituting a grant of immunity to conduct
seeking to influence some significant policy determination in the appli-
cation of a statute, and not a technical decision implementing a stat-
ute.82 The court first focused upon the goveinmental act involved in
setting the production allowables and determined that it was not a pol-
icy decision because the false forecasts were applied to a predeter-
mined formula in a mechanical fashion to calculate the allowables."
The court then classified the defendants' attempts to influence that
governmental act as joint business behavior, not political activity." If
the governmental act had been a policy decisidn, then the defendants'
conduct, despite its deceitful nature, would have been considered po-
litical activity and consequently immune under Noerr-Pennington.
The limitation imposed upon the Noerr-Pennington immunity by
the Woods court is somewhat broader than the courts' interpretation
of political activity in Trucking Unlimited. That court defined the po-
litical activity referred to in Noerr as those efforts by people seeking
to make their wishes known to their representatives in the legislative
and executive branches of government.85 The Woods interpretation of
political activity leaves room for classifying participation in a regula-
tory scheme as political activity. In fact, the Woods court stated that
so The court held that the defendants' own jointly financed, well publicized program
of opposing all applications had a significant deterrent effect, in and of itself, without
procuring governmental action. 432 F.2d at 762-63.
81 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.) II 73,422 at 89,724 (5th Cir. 1971).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.	 •	 ,.tr;:
85 432 F.2d at 758 n.3.
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the formulation of the allowables formula was political in nature in the
Noerr sense, and that participation in that formulation would have
been protected by Noerr." Woods, then, holds that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine protects participation in the regulatory process,
but limits that protection to participation in policy-making decisions.
In effect, then, it is the type of governmental decision that determines
whether conduct aimed at influencing that decision will be consid-
ered political activity, and consequently whether immunity will be
granted.87
The court in Trucking Unlimited also focused upon the govern-
mental decision sought to be influenced in its attempt to limit the
sweep of the Noerr-Pennington immunity. It singled out governmental
adjudicatory processes and held that attempts to influence those pro-
cesses will not be immune. However, the Trucking Unlimited court did
not classify the defendants' activity as political or apolitical, but ra-
ther, chose to distinguish adjudicatory processes by showing that no
impairment in governmental regulation of trade would result if anti-
trust immunity were not extended to these processes. Woods justified
application of the Sherman Act by reasoning that only apolitical ac-
tivity could be proscribed, while Trucking Unlimited justified the
antitrust proscription by reasoning that no resulting impairment in
governmental regulation of trade would ensue. Each court placed pri-
mary emphasis on a different underlying rationale of Noerr. If the
defendants' activity in Woods is examined in light of the reasoning in
Trucking Unlimited, the result would be the same as that reached by
the Woods court. Because of the nature of the defendants' activity in
Woods, it is obvious that no impairment of government regulation of
trade would result from application of the Sherman Act. If Trucking
Unlimited, on the other hand, is examined in light of the Woods'
reasoning, application of the Sherman Act would arguably curtail
political activity in that the government decision of whether to grant
an operating license appears to be a "policy" issue. But if the adjudi-
catory decision in Trucking Unlimited was not a policy decision,88
Trucking Unlimited is consistent with Woods.
The obvious impairment of government regulation of trade in
Woods, and the apolitical nature of the defendants' activities, present
a situation in which it is relatively easy to determine that the Noerr-
Pennington immunity should not be granted. In Trucking Unlimited,
on the other hand, the defendants' actions involve, in part, not only
activity that would arguably enhance government regulation of trade,
but also attempts to influence governmental action which is quasi-
political in nature.
80 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.) 73,422 at 89,724 (5th Cir. 1971).
87 Id.
88 The court in Trucking Unlimited did not state that the adjudicatory decisions
sought to be influenced by the defendants were not policy determinations; however, the
court did imply that such determinations were not policy decisions. 432 F.2d at 762.
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V. THE INTEGRITY OF THE REGULATORY PROCESS
There was another aspect of the defendants' conduct in Woods
which the court considered important in determining whether im-
munity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine should be extended. The
court looked upon the defendants' conduct as undermining the efficacy
of the state administrative body's function." The court compared this
conduct to the defendants' activities in Trucking Unlimited in dis-
couraging and blocking access to government agencies." The court
seemed concerned that activities which fundamentally detract from
the proper functioning of government regulatory bodies should not
themselves be given antitrust immunity.'" This consideration lends
itself to a balancing test in which the right of access to the regulatory
processes is weighed against the abuse of those same processes to
which the defendants are seeking access. By allowing Sherman Act
sanction when there is an abuse of a government regulatory process
causing injury to competitors, the court helps maintain the integrity
of the regulatory scheme while curtailing anti-competitive activity.
If one group's access to a regulatory agency is blocking the access
of another group, as the defendants' activity in Trucking Unlimited
was, then, despite the lack of any direct business injury to those that
cannot obtain access, the Sherman Act should apply. This would be
in keeping with the rationale of United States v. Harriss,g2 in which
the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act."
In that case, the plaintiff alleged that that Act infringed upon the
First Amendment freedoms of speech, press and petition." The Court
observed that the Act was designed to prevent the "drowning out"
of the voice of the people by the voice of special interest groups." In
holding that the Act did not infringe upon the First Amendment, the
Court distinguished between congressional prohibition of lobbying
pressures and the identification of them in order to maintain the in-
tegrity of a basic governmental process." For this same reason, when
the activities of one business group effectively "drown out" the voice
of other businesses before regulatory agencies, as happened in Truck-
89 The Woods court stated: "In light of this determination we hold that the abuse
of the administrative process here alleged does not justify antitrust immunity." 5 Trade
Reg. Rep. (1971 Trade Cas.) g 73,422 at 89,725 (5th Cir. 1971).
90 Id. at 89,724.
91 The Woods court considered the defendants' filing of false production forecasts as
an "attempt to undermine the formula's] efficacy for anti-competitive purposes," and
compared this with the defendants' attempt in Trucking Unlimited to "undermine a well
defined policy with regard to licensing operators by blocking and discouraging access to
the governmental agencies." Id.
02 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
98 2 U.S.C. H 261-70 (1964). This act requires designated reports to Congress from
the persons receiving or expending money for lobbying purposes, and also requires pro-
fessional lobbyists to register with Congress and make specific disclosures.
94
 347 U.S. at 625.
N Id.
90 Li.
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ing Unlimited and to some extent in Woods, the Sherman Act might be
applied and still not endanger the First Amendment right to petition."
In effect then, the Sherman Act would be used to prevent abuses of the
regulatory process when private groups use that process to further
anti-competitive objectives in such a manner that either the regulatory
agency is unable to control these anti-competitive activities or the
agency is precluded from more effective regulation of trade by their
activities.
In Woods, there is no "drowning out" of competitors as in
Trucking Unlimited, but rather, an undermining of the regulatory
scheme when the agency is in such a position that it cannot protect
other competitors by verification of the submitted forecasts. When this
happens, the scrutiny and approval of business activities by a govern-
mental body is missing from the regulatory scheme and the Sherman
Act should be applied. Sherman Act proscription to maintain the
proper functioning of the regulatory scheme would be consistent with
the broader concern in Noerr that government regulation remain via-
ble and responsive to all groups seeking it. In fact, both of these recent
decisions indicate that abuse of the regulatory process will not be
tolerated, and that the Noerr-Pennington defense will not be applied
where this abuse exists. While the Woods court bad little difficulty
in determining if the Noerr-Pennington immunity should apply, the
court in Trucking Unlimited had to strain the rationale of Noerr to
limit the antitrust immunity in a situation where there was a clear
abuse of the regulatory process.
CONCLUSION
These recent decisions have applied limitations to the Noerr-
Pennington immunity that have greatly reduced its applicability. Yet,
these limitations appear, for the most part, consistent with the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in Noerr. Trucking Unlimited strained the
rationale of Noerr to prevent the application of antitrust immunity
primarily because it appeared that the adjudicatory processes could
and did use the information and opinions provided by the defendants.
Its overall effect, however, in eliminating the discouragement to filing
applications, and, consequently, providing freer access to smaller
truckers is in keeping with Noerr's rationale. Woods was clearly
consistent with Noerr and built upon its rationale to develop a new
limitation to antitrust immunity. But the main concern of both courts
was to prevent abuse of the regulatory process. These courts decided
that despite a right of access to or participation in a regulatory process,
the Sherman Act will be applied when that right is exercised in a
manner that interferes with the business of competitors and at the
same time hinders the regulatory process.
As government regulation of trade relies more heavily upon the
97 Cf. Note, Application of the Sherman Act to Attempts to Influence Governmental
Action, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 847, 857 (1968).
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industry - being regulated to assist in its own regulation, the courts
apparently will be very careful not to allow abuses to arise within this
close relationship. The new limits of antitrust immunity set out in
these recent cases will be helpful in insuring that regulatory agencies
are not used to further a group's anti-competitive objectives when
those objectives undermine the regulatory process itself.
BERNARD J. COONEY
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